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A critical reflection on the conceptual and legal foundations of the duty to 
prevent torture 
 
Abstract 
The present article elaborates on the legal and normative foundations of the duty to prevent 
torture. It argues that the content of this duty is both deceivingly simple and complex. The duty, as 
currently understood, requires States to take a range of legislative, administrative, and judicial 
measures to prevent acts of torture. However this range of measures and approaches opens the 
door to endless scenarios of potential relevance, that somewhat blur the content of the duty itself. 
In order to circumscribe and clarify the nature and scope of the duty it is argued that, firstly, it is 
necessary to sever the concept of prevention from the definitional elements on which the concept 
of prohibition of torture is premised and to focus on the conditions known to generate a risk of 
torture, namely those associated with deprivation of liberty. Secondly, the article suggests that by 
locating the duty to prevent in a positive obligation framework, more specifically in the positive 
obligation ‘to fulfil’, the general duty can be distinguished from the measures through which the 
former is actually fulfilled. The article suggests that such an approach would facilitate the 
anticipatory potential of the prevention of torture and allow thinking more broadly about 
implementation strategies to eradicate torture. 
Keywords: torture, deprivation of liberty, prevention, prohibition, positive obligations 
 
“You’ve forgotten that we, whatever we might be, are at this moment in relation to you at least free 
men, and that’s no mean superiority”  
The trial, F Kafka 
Introduction 
The right to be free from torture and other forms of ill-treatment is a fundamental human 
right recognised and enshrined in a significant number of international conventions and 
treaties.1 This right entails a set of corresponding duties upon States to prohibit and, this 
paper argues, to prevent acts amounting to torture or ill-treatment. However while the legal 
construction of the concept of prohibition of torture has received, and rightly so, much of the 
judicial, and advocacy attention,2 as well as the intellectual thrust of authoritative and highly 
respected academic work,3 the duty to prevent torture, has remained relatively under-explored 
and, arguably, under-conceptualised. This is not to say that ‘torture prevention’ as a general 
concept lacks a sufficient degree of recognition or support among international agencies or 
national actors tasked with combatting torture and other forms of ill-treatment. Indeed the 
adoption of international procedural instruments like the European Convention for the 
Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (ECPT) and the 
Optional Protocol for the Prevention of Torture (OPCAT) are a clear acknowledgement of the 
importance of prevention as a strategic approach in the fight against torture. Furthermore the 
mechanisms set up under these Conventions together with international agencies and non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) have produced, over the years, a rather copious and 
comprehensive range of policy and guidance documents laying down ‘guidelines’, 
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‘measures’, and ‘approaches’ aimed at preventing the occurrence of such inhuman and 
degrading practices.4 But what the present paper suggests is that these developments have 
fallen short of, or perhaps even consciously avoided, the crucial task of developing and 
elaborating on the legal definition and normative building blocks of a general duty to prevent.    
In many ways, it could be argued that ‘torture prevention’ has emerged at a policy level 
without much elaboration on the legal foundations of the rather complex, if coherent, edifice 
of measures, guidelines, and recommendations aimed at curbing and preventing the abhorrent 
practice of torture. The article argues in section 2 that even the, few and sparse, attempts to 
elaborate in a more coherent fashion on a ‘duty to prevent’ torture, have been partly limited  
by the extensive hinging on the, more established but arguably functionally and normatively 
distinct, legal and conceptual building blocks underpinning the prohibition’s approach to 
torture. Overall, it could be argued, the definition of the duty to prevent torture has remained 
the poor relative of the definition of torture prohibition.  
The content of the duty to prevent torture is both simple and complex. It is simple insofar as 
it requires States to take effective legislative, administrative, judicial or other measures, some 
of which are widely acknowledged, to prevent acts of torture. The complexity arises out of 
the fact that it remains to be defined in what circumstances does this duty arise, what does it 
entail as a matter of legal obligation, what is the nature of preventive measures. The present 
article seeks to elaborate on the legal and normative foundations of the duty to prevent 
torture, understood as a general and autonomous legal obligation imposed upon States. This 
elaboration is premised on two important analytical steps, that are briefly outlined here and 
that will be discussed further in sections 4 and 5 below. Firstly, it is argued that the 
conceptualisation of an autonomous legal duty to prevent requires a change of focus, a move 
away from the definitional elements on which the concept of prohibition of torture is 
premised, namely:  the intentional infliction of severe pain or suffering, the purpose of the 
acts, and the official sanction requirement. It will be noted below, in section 2, that some of 
the existing elaborations on torture prevention are heavily influenced by torture prohibition 
concepts that are arguably ill-suited to the task of establishing a functional legal duty to 
prevent, partly because of the different contextual circumstances in which preventive 
mechanisms may be desirable or necessary. Indeed prevention is not about what has 
happened but, to state the obvious, is about anticipating and regulating situations where 
torture may occur, and thus requires the elaboration of forward looking legal obligations as 
well as policy measures for the containment of situations of risk, rather than backward 
looking and retrospective culpability tests which are more suitable to the torture prohibition 
framework. The present article posits that these situations of risk are usually associated with 
deprivation of liberty and the underlying relationship of subordination between the individual 
or groups of individuals whose liberty has been curtailed and the authority exercising control. 
It is in the context of deprivation of liberty that, the article suggest, the duty is triggered.  
This article also suggest that a second analytical step necessary to the conceptualisation of an 
autonomous duty to prevent is connected to the identification of the positive obligation ‘to 
fulfil’ as the appropriate positive obligation framework for fleshing out the nature and scope 
of the duty. It will be argued that whilst in international human rights law there is no general 
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duty to prevent, there are explicit treaty based obligations to prevent specific human rights 
violations. These are usually formulated in action oriented language. For instance Articles 2 
and 16 of the United Nations Convention against Torture and Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment (UNCAT) require states to take ‘effective’ measures to prevent 
torture and other ill-treatment. While the scope of this might at first appear unclear, section 4 
points out that the jurisprudence and practice of a number of international human rights 
bodies appears to endorse a positive obligation framework. In particular the duty to prevent 
appears to be filtered through the positive obligation ‘to protect’. The article argues that, as a 
positive obligation ‘to protect’, the duty arises in reaction to imminent or actual risks rather 
than in situations generally associated with risk of ill-treatment. The effect is that prevention 
of ill-treatment remains largely reactive rather than pre-emptive. However it is submitted that 
when elaborated through the theoretical prism of the positive obligation ‘to fulfil’ the 
dynamic and open-ended nature of the general duty to prevent torture is acknowledged 
revealing its anticipatory potential. At the same time the framework helps to distinguish and 
avoid conflating the general duty with discrete legal obligations with a preventive potential. 
These may indeed contribute towards the fulfilment of the general duty but they are a tool to 
an end. As an ongoing and fluid obligation the implications of the general duty to prevent 
torture go well beyond a set of legal obligations and may encompass endless types of 
measures which need to be evaluated in each specific context and against a set of explicit 
parameters. Framing the duty to prevent through a positive obligation ‘to fulfil’ approach not 
only brings greater conceptual and normative clarity, it also allows thinking more broadly 
about new implementation measures and strategies to eradicate torture and other ill-treatment 
whilst restoring the individual to his rightful rights-bearer status.  
In pursuing these two sets of arguments, the following section 2 begins by providing a brief 
reconstruction of the prominence of the prohibition of torture framework, and of its 
dominance over the, admittedly quite limited, attempts and elaborations of the duty to 
prevent. Section 3 provides a critical reconstruction of the reasons justifying a distinct 
approach in the conceptualisation of the two distinct duties to prevent and to prohibit torture. 
Sections 4 and 5 examine the legal and normative dimension of the duty to prevent as a 
positive obligation. Here the article seeks, on the one side, to conceptualize and to develop 
the abstract general duty and, on the other side, it seeks to illustrate how the duty to prevent 
torture translates into operational measures, be these legal obligations, standards or policy 
measures. Finally, section 6 concludes. 
 
The prominence of the prohibition of torture  
 
The prohibition of torture is considered, and rightly so, a fundamental norm of international 
law. The  ECtHR case Cestaro v Italy5 reminds us of the importance of punishing such acts 
and enacting adequate criminal legislation prohibiting torture in a democratic society in order 
to hold official state authorities accountable for acts of an ‘absolute gravity’6 such as those 
committed during the 2000 G-8 Summit in Genoa and to deter repetition. The battle to outlaw 
torture and other ill-treatment internationally has been a long one culminating with the 
adoption of the 1975 UN Declaration against Torture and the 1984 UN Convention against 
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Torture, the recognition of the absolute nature of the prohibition and of its customary status 
under international law. Indeed, as noted in the introductory paragraphs of this article, the 
prohibition of torture is enshrined in a number of international human rights instruments and 
is now accepted as a peremptory norm of international law. Under the international 
prohibition of torture states are required to refrain from committing torture and to investigate, 
prosecute, and punish those responsible for acts of torture. The breach of the prohibition of 
torture involves, on the one hand, the establishment of state responsibility and, on the other 
hand, the establishment of individual penal responsibility.7 In both cases the applicable 
definition of torture and of its constituent elements understandably becomes of crucial 
importance in determining legal responsibility.8  
The jurisprudence on cases of torture has been, unfortunately, abundant and the definition of 
torture has proved to be normatively complex with new definitions emerging in international 
criminal law instruments and case law from international penal tribunals.9  However, as the 
following sub-sections point out, while the definitional issues so central to the prohibition 
have come to dominate the debates concerning torture one - possibly unintended - 
consequence has been that the definition of torture and its prohibition have come to influence 
the understanding of the prevention of torture, even more so, in the absence of a clear 
understanding of what the duty to prevent ought to entail.   
The influence of the prohibition on the prevention of torture  
Article 2(1) UNCAT states that “Each State Party shall take effective legislative, 
administrative, judicial or other measures to prevent acts of torture in any territory under its 
jurisdiction”. This key provision nominally addresses torture prevention as a separate 
international legal obligation. Admittedly this action oriented provision is rather vague and in 
need of further elaboration. However, it is suggested, attempts to do so have ultimately 
conflated it with the obligation to prohibit torture.  In 2008 the Committee against Torture 
(CAT), the body responsible for implementing the UNCAT, adopted a General Comment 
clarifying ‘the content of the obligation to take effective measures to prevent torture’.10 
Arguably, this General Comment is illustrative of the dominance of the prohibition 
framework and of the centrality of the definition of torture with a focus on measures that are 
in effect functional to the prohibition of torture such as the criminalisation of torture and 
combating impunity. The comment reads ‘States parties must make the offence of torture 
punishable as an offence under its criminal law, in accordance, at a minimum, with the 
elements of torture as defined in article 1 of the Convention, and the requirements of article 
4’. In paragraph 9 the comment continues:  
Serious discrepancies between the Convention’s definition and that incorporated into domestic law create 
actual or potential loopholes for impunity. (…) the Committee calls upon each State party to ensure that 
all parts of its Government adhere to the definition set forth in the Convention for the purpose of defining 
the obligations of the State. (…) the Committee emphasizes that elements of intent and purpose 
(emphasis added) in article 1 do not involve a subjective inquiry into the motivations of the perpetrators, 
but rather must be objective determinations under the circumstances. It is essential to investigate and 
establish the responsibility of persons in the chain of command as well as that of the direct 
perpetrator(s).11 
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The comment rather than elaborating on the duty to prevent reiterates the importance of the 
definitional elements of torture for the purpose of criminalising such acts under domestic 
legislation. It then provides an open-ended list of effective measures and guarantees ranging 
from maintaining an official register of detainees, the right of detainees to be informed of 
their rights to the right to challenge the legality of their detention or treatment.12 As some 
expert commentators have noted, efforts to clarify the content of a legal obligation to prevent 
torture and/or other forms of ill-treatment  have focused on ‘elaborating existing legal 
obligations and highlighting their preventive potential, reinforcing the primacy of the 
prohibition and seeing prevention as an ancillary measure. Yet torture prevention is not about 
fulfilling international commitments concerning the prohibition of torture.’13  
In 2002 the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights adopted the Robben Island 
Guidelines for the Prohibition and Prevention of Torture (RIG) intended to provide guidance 
on the implementation of Article 5 (prohibition of torture) of the African Charter on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights.14 Interestingly the implementation guide accompanying the Guidelines 
stresses the existence of the separate but interrelated obligations to prohibit and to prevent 
torture.15The practical guide goes on to state that ‘The obligation to prevent torture means 
that governments must take positive action’ and provides some examples of preventive 
measures such as  ‘introducing oversight and monitoring mechanisms;  implementing 
measures to improve conditions of detention, etc.’16In spite of this distinction highlighting the 
proactive nature of the obligation to prevent the Committee for the Prevention of Torture in 
Africa (CPTA), the monitoring body established to oversee the implementation of the RIG, in 
a more recent interpretative comment on Article 5 appears, once more, to give prominence to 
the absolute prohibition of torture and ill-treatment. The Committee stressed, in line with its 
overall mandate, the intention to develop a series of general comments which ‘will 
significantly strengthen the absolute prohibition of torture and ill-treatment on the 
continent’.17The comment provides a non-exhaustive list of possible general comments to be 
adopted18 but there appears to be no reference to prevention as such, arguably subsuming the 
latter under the more robust notion of prohibition. This lack of conceptual and normative 
clarity is not only detrimental in itself but also in terms of the effectiveness of the CPTA’s 
work, which has been described as failing to develop an actual strategy on the prevention of 
torture and other ill-treatment in Africa.19 
More generally, the resulting conflation of prevention with the prohibition of torture not only 
brings confusion with regard to the states’ legal obligations, it also limits the way state actors, 
human rights bodies, civil society, and activists might think about how to get to grips with 
torture by skewing strategic intervention, with some exceptions,20 in favour of legislative 
reforms for the criminalisation of torture and of fighting impunity through litigation.21 As 
important and valuable as these interventions are, prevention of torture is something more as 
well as something different from a procedural obligation implementing the prohibition. It 
might not be sufficient, for example, for a policy paper setting out interrogation techniques 
simply to refer and remind interrogators of the absolute prohibition of torture and ill-
treatment if specific safeguards and oversight mechanisms, which can be said to 
operationalize the duty to prevent, are not in place.22 As the Subcommittee for the Prevention 
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of Torture (SPT) has authoritatively opined “Whilst the obligation to prevent torture and ill-
treatment buttresses the prohibition of torture, it also remains an obligation in its own 
right”.23 In spite of the recognition of the existence of two separate and autonomous duties 
the scope, the nature and content of the obligation to prevent torture are still in need of some 
elaboration. In attempting to do so the article, in the following sections, seeks first to separate 
the concept of the prohibition from the prevention of torture considering when and in what 
circumstances the duty to prevent is triggered. Secondly, on the basis of the jurisprudence and 
practice of various international human rights bodies the article locates the duty to prevent in 
a positive obligation framework as the most appropriate for conceptualising the nature and 
content of the general duty to prevent torture. Lastly, the article examines some examples of 
discrete preventive measures, both legal and not, which illustrate how the general duty might 
be translated and fulfilled in practice. 
Prohibition and prevention: conceptually and legally distinct duties  
Conceptually the duty to prevent and the duty to prohibit torture refer to two different points 
in time. The duty to prohibit torture is generally engaged in ex post facto situations. Indeed 
state and/or individual criminal responsibility is engaged once the act(s) has taken place. In 
this sense it could be said that the prohibition is essentially retrospective or reactive in 
character.  Notwithstanding the fact that deterrence of criminal sanctions may have a 
preventive effect, this kind of action remains essentially remedial. In stark contrast with this 
approach, the duty to prevent is, or ought to be, concerned with a state’s obligation to take 
action before torture may occur and irrespective of whether it may occur or not. In this sense 
the duty to prevent can be said to focus on ex ante facto situations and to be proactive and 
anticipatory. A meaningful concept of prevention should therefore not focus its attention on 
the actual acts, but rather on the situations or conditions of risk of torture. Crucially, unlike in 
the case of the prohibition, the focus is not, or should not be, on characterising certain acts as 
torture or other forms of ill-treatment. Indeed the legal qualms over whether an act amounts 
to torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment (CIDT) become largely irrelevant for 
prevention purposes. As noted by the CAT itself, ‘the conditions (emphasis added) that give 
rise to ill-treatment frequently facilitate torture and therefore the measures required to prevent 
torture must be applied to prevent ill-treatment’.24 So the emphasis, in the torture prevention 
optic, ought to be placed on the conditions of risk, rather than on the acts themselves.  
These, as noted in the following subsection, have been traditionally and uncontroversially 
understood to be associated with deprivation of liberty.  Before discussing the duty to prevent 
it is worthwhile briefly to point out first what deprivation of liberty means and its 
significance for torture prevention purposes. 
Power relations and vulnerability induced by deprivation of liberty 
One only needs to look at the drafting history of the Declaration and the Convention against 
Torture and the Optional Protocol to realize that prisoners and persons deprived of their 
liberty were intended to be their primary beneficiaries.25 Sir Nigel Rodley, referring to torture 
as a ‘crime of opportunity’, rightly notes that “If only by virtue of their powers of detention, 
law enforcement officers have more opportunity than most to criminally abuse those in their 
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charge: these opportunities need[ed] to be restricted or removed.”26 The idea that torture is 
more likely to occur in detention or similar situations is also endorsed by the definition of 
torture as a crime against humanity by other instruments, such as the Rome Statute27 which 
requires the victim to be ‘in the custody or control of the accused’.28 The UN Special 
Rapporteur on torture has endorsed the concept of ‘powerlessness’,29 in the attempt to 
articulate the contingent unequal power relations between those exercising authority or 
elements of authority and the individual(s) deprived of their liberty. The very nature of these 
power relations is understood to induce and entail a status of vulnerability.30 
Similarly the Courts have emphasised the existence of a ‘relationship of subordination’ 
between the person whose liberty is curtailed and the authorities exercising control: 
‘Given this unique relationship and interaction of subordination between an inmate and the State, the 
latter must undertake a number of special responsibilities and initiatives (emphasis added) to ensure that 
persons deprived of their liberty have the conditions necessary to live with dignity and to enable them to 
enjoy those rights that may not be restricted under any circumstances or those whose restriction is not a 
necessary consequence of their deprivation of liberty and is, therefore, impermissible’.31 
Arguably, the existence of a ‘relationship of subordination’ in these specific circumstances 
and the consequent vulnerability objectively arising from this relationship create an automatic 
risk assumption. In dealing with this risk States are expected not only to refrain from 
interfering with the right to be free from torture but also ‘to undertake a number of special 
responsibilities and initiatives’. International human rights law has witnessed an extensive 
development of various international instruments containing provisions, rules and standards 
pertaining to the treatment of those deprived of their liberty, mostly in the criminal justice 
system.32 It is worthwhile to note that among these international instruments are those setting 
up monitoring bodies, such as the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture (CPT) 
and the Subcommittee for the Prevention of Torture (SPT)33 as well as national preventive 
mechanisms, entrusted with carrying out regular visits to places of detention. However while 
initially standard setting and monitoring was primarily focusing on prisoners’ rights in the 
criminal justice system its scope has increasingly expanded to include other sites. This 
expansion has been arguably influenced by the broad definition of deprivation of liberty, as 
further elaborated in the following subsection. 
 
 The definition of deprivation of liberty and the implications in a torture preventive context 
The ECtHR has found that  in order to determine whether there has been a deprivation of 
liberty, ‘the starting point must be the specific situation of the individual concerned and 
account must be taken of a whole range of factors arising in a particular case such as the type, 
duration, effects and manner of implementation of the measure in question. The distinction 
between a deprivation of, and restriction upon, liberty is merely one of degree or intensity 
and not one of nature or substance’.34 In determining the existence of a deprivation of liberty 
the courts will typically consider whether someone is under continuous supervision and 
control and is not free to leave.35 This may extend to deprivation of liberty by private 
individuals or non-state actors.36 Similarly Article 4(2) of the Optional Protocol to the 
Convention against Torture (OPCAT) defines the scope of ‘deprivation of liberty’ as 
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embracing ‘any form of detention or imprisonment or the placement of a person in a public or 
private custodial setting, from which this person is not permitted to leave at will by order of 
any judicial, administrative or other authority’.37 
Under such a broad definition deprivation of liberty might take a variety of forms other than 
classic detention in prison or strict arrest.38 ‘Places of detention’ and ‘places where people are 
deprived of their liberty’ may be understood to apply to settings other than traditional ones 
such as prisons or police cells. The CAT has expressed that ‘each State party should prohibit, 
prevent and redress torture and ill-treatment in all contexts of custody or control, for example, 
in prisons, hospitals, schools, institutions that engage in the care of children, the aged, the 
mentally ill or disabled, in military service, and other institutions as well as contexts where 
the failure of the State to intervene encourages and enhances the danger of privately inflicted 
harm’.39 It is not surprising then that a monitoring body such as the CPT has progressively 
widened the range of places of deprivation of liberty it might visit to include ‘not only police 
establishments and prisons, but also psychiatric hospitals, detention facilities for foreigners 
held under aliens legislation, juvenile and military detention centres and social care homes’.40 
The CPT visiting practice in recent years has developed further to include ‘monitoring return 
flights and examining the treatment of foreign nationals during their deportation by air’.41 
The OPCAT has also embraced a broad approach to the concept of places of detention and 
deprivation of liberty which might include the more traditional criminal justice settings as 
well as other places where people are detained by public order such as immigration centres 
and psychiatric hospitals.42 Possibly these are just some examples of ‘places’ of detention in a 
list, which can be further extended. This is particularly true if the concept of deprivation of 
liberty is, as it is suggested, underpinned by the ideas of power relations and control. For 
example, it is possible to speculate about the increasing promotion of non-custodial measures 
or community provision as an alternative to detention in the criminal justice system or in 
psychiatric institutions respectively. While avoiding deprivation of liberty in large institutions 
as far as possible is possibly one of the most effective means of preventing torture and ill-
treatment, alternative measures might well raise the issues of power and control exercised in 
their application.43 Therefore, if a duty to prevent torture applies to these other, structurally 
and spatially spread, ‘sites’ it then becomes necessary to think how does a preventive system 
account for these ‘new’ settings and new class of actors, what new measures, if any, or 
adjustments are necessary. 
The broadening of the range of places of detention also means that the class of individuals 
deemed to be deprived of their liberty extends beyond that of prisoners in the criminal justice 
system. This also entails that the objective vulnerability associated with the condition of 
being deprived of liberty may intersect with the individual’s own subjective vulnerabilities 
and that a shift in focus ought to occur from the actual sites of vulnerability to vulnerability 
itself. As the UN Sub-Committee for the Prevention of Torture put it ‘Although all those in 
detention form a vulnerable group, some groups suffer particular vulnerability, such as 
women, juveniles, members of minority groups, foreign nationals, persons with disabilities, 
and persons with acute medical or psychological dependencies or conditions’.44 
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The duty to prevent torture and states’ positive obligations 
It is thus in the contexts of deprivation of liberty that arguably the duty to prevent torture 
arises. As already mentioned, the vulnerability induced in such settings creates an automatic 
risk assumption. But what does the duty to prevent entail as a matter of legal obligation?  
Admittedly this is less clear. While under international human rights law there is no evidence 
of a general obligation ‘to prevent’ there are some explicit treaty-based obligations to prevent 
human rights violations.45 However none of these international instruments provide a clear 
definition of what an obligation to prevent means, some refer to a state’s obligation to take 
“appropriate”46 and/or “necessary”47 measures in order to prevent human rights violations. 
Similarly Articles 2 UNCAT and Article 8(2) of the 2004 Arab Charter on Human Rights 
place upon the ratifying state an obligation to take ‘effective measures’ to prevent acts of 
torture.48 The duty is arguably formulated in action-oriented language. Rather than an 
obligation for states actually to succeed in preventing torture49 it appears to place a positive 
obligation upon the state to take action.  
It is broadly acknowledged today in both doctrinal work and jurisprudence that human rights 
guarantees entail both negative and positive obligations. As noted by Fredman a right carries 
with it three correlating types of obligations: the negative obligation to avoid or refrain from 
depriving individuals of their rights, the positive obligation to protect individuals against 
deprivations of their rights by others, and the positive obligation to fulfil or enable the right 
holders’ access to and effective enjoyment of human rights.50 Accordingly the right to be free 
from torture carries with it its own correlating types of obligations. Under the obligation to 
respect, a state has a duty not to interfere with the right and this is formulated in the language 
of the prohibition. The obligation might encompass a subset of procedural obligations 
whereby the state is required to take specific measures to criminalize, investigate and 
prosecute any acts of torture. As already argued, these are essentially functional to the 
prohibition.  Under the obligation to protect a state has a duty to protect in specific 
circumstances against the threat or interference by individuals other than state officials, and 
under the obligation to fulfil the state has a duty to create the conditions whereby individuals 
or groups of individuals actually enjoy the right to be free from torture. It is under these latter 
types of positive obligations that the duty to prevent can be located. As noted in the next 
section, the jurisprudence of various international courts appears to endorse the idea, in 
particular, that a duty to prevent the breach of a specific human right is underpinned by the 
state’s positive duty to protect. While this approach can to some extent be seen to support the 
anticipatory nature of prevention the latter, it is argued, is best served by the positive 
obligation to fulfil.  
The duty to prevent and the positive obligation to protect 
A helpful illustration of the duty to prevent as a positive obligation to protect is the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) case Application of the Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide case. In addressing the duty to prevent genocide the 
Court made the preliminary observation acknowledging the existence of two separate 
obligations, a negative and a positive one, it noted specifically that: ‘The obligation on each 
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contracting State to prevent genocide is both normative and compelling. It is not merged in 
the duty to punish, nor can it be regarded as simply a component of that duty. It has its own 
scope (…)’.51 In defining that scope the Court found that: 
it is clear that the obligation in question is one of conduct and not one of result, in the 
sense that a State cannot be under an obligation to succeed, whatever the circumstances, 
in preventing the commission of genocide: the obligation of States parties is rather to 
employ all means reasonably available to them, so as to prevent genocide so far as 
possible. A State does not incur responsibility simply because the desired result is not 
achieved; responsibility is however incurred if the State manifestly failed to take all 
measures to prevent genocide which were within its power, and which might have 
contributed to preventing the genocide.52 
In a further passage the Court stated: 
a State’s obligation to prevent, and the corresponding duty to act, arise at the instant that the State learns 
of, or should normally have learned of, the existence of a serious risk that genocide will be committed. 
From that moment onwards, if the State has available to it means likely to have a deterrent effect on 
those suspected of preparing genocide, or reasonably suspected of harbouring specific intent (dolus 
specialis), it is under a duty to make such use of these means as the circumstances permit.53 
Mutatis mutandi, the same approach appears in the ECtHR jurisprudence on failure to take 
appropriate action to prevent a violation of Article 3.  
 
The obligation imposed on High Contracting Parties under Article 1 of the Convention to secure to 
everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in the Convention, taken together with 
Article 3, requires States to take measures designed to ensure that individuals within their jurisdiction are 
not subjected to torture or inhuman or degrading treatment, including such ill-treatment administered by 
private individuals. State responsibility may therefore be engaged where the framework of law fails to 
provide adequate protection or where the authorities fail to take reasonable steps to avoid a risk of ill-
treatment about which they knew or ought to have known.54 
 
It is evident that in well-defined circumstances, that is where the state is or should be aware 
of an imminent risk posed by either a private individual or official authority to an individual 
or a group of individuals, a state has a positive duty to take all reasonable operational 
measures to protect the individual(s)  at risk.55 However while the duty to prevent framed 
through a positive obligation to protect can be said to be narrowly preventive it is still 
reacting to events which are real and imminent.  But is this all there is to prevention? If 
prevention is about dealing with torture and other-ill-treatment proactively rather than 
reactively and it is to be of relevance irrespective of whether there is any evidence of torture 
or ill-treatment actually taking place then the duty to prevent has to go beyond the positive 
obligation to protect. If the right to be free from torture is to be secured the duty to prevent 
must go beyond restraint of impending action to include a positive duty to secure the 
possibility of the right to be free from torture being exercised irrespective of the imminent 
nature of an existing threat.  
The duty to prevent and the positive obligation to fulfil 
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It is submitted that for the duty to prevent torture to contribute to a concrete and effective 
system of prevention, it needs to be understood within a more comprehensive positive 
obligation framework.  
As discussed in the previous sections, the duty to prevent or ‘to take effective measures’ is 
largely understood in terms of the positive obligation to protect. In this section it is argued 
that the duty to prevent is also underpinned by the second type of positive obligation: the 
obligation to fulfil. The latter broadly requires ‘the removal of constraints, as well as the 
provision of resources or the facilitation of activities which ensure that all are substantively 
equal in the ability to participate fully as citizens in society.’56 Similarly to the obligation to 
protect, the obligation ‘to fulfil’ is also conduct based but rather than intervening in relation 
to an immediate threat or risk posed by third parties it requires the state to adopt appropriate 
general measures –legislative, administrative, budgetary, judicial, educational, and other- to 
facilitate the actual enjoyment of rights.  
The rationale for a duty to fulfil is ‘that individuals have rights which must be fulfilled’.57 
Just as there are negative and positive duties there are corresponding negative and positive 
rights, in the latter case, rights to a positive act by the state.58 A positive right to an act may 
not necessarily mean access to a specific object but access to enabling arrangements or 
framework.59  The state is to provide this framework and activate it.60 The actual content of 
the framework will depend on the right to be secured and the particular context. Therefore in 
the case of the prevention of torture the duty to prevent requires that attention be paid to the 
specific form of deprivation of liberty and the characteristics of the individuals or groups of 
individuals involved. Clearly arrangements for those detained in immigration centres will be 
very different from those needed in a psychiatric hospital or in a prison and again these 
should account for the specific characteristics of the individuals concerned based on age, sex, 
race, gender, sexual orientation and so forth. As the Subcommittee for the Prevention of 
Torture has explained the prevention of torture and ill-treatment ‘embraces – or should 
embrace – as many as possible of those things which in a given situation can contribute 
towards the lessening of the likelihood or risk of torture or ill-treatment occurring. Such an 
approach requires not only that there be compliance with relevant international obligations 
and standards in both form and substance but that attention also be paid to the whole range of 
other factors relevant to the experience and treatment of persons deprived of their liberty and 
which by their very nature will be context specific’.61 The framework generated by the action 
of the State may be made up of a variety of regulatory measures such as action plans, 
policies, guidelines, institutional arrangements and more, and importantly it should not stop 
at relevant legal standards. 
 
The contextual, variable and ongoing nature of the positive measures to be put in place 
highlight the open-ended and dynamic nature of obligation which may lend it to criticism of 
indeterminacy.62 However the relative indeterminacy which positive obligations may display 
is ‘no different from the kind of indeterminacy found in many other legal norms’.63 Moreover 
some general conceptual parameters underpinning and circumscribing the scope of the duty 
can be identified. Fredman identifies the parameters of: effectiveness, participation, 
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accountability and equality.64 Effectiveness requires that whatever framework is set up and 
measures are taken by the State, these must be appropriate and aimed at achieving the right in 
question.65 Secondly, under the participation criterion, measures adopted must enhance the 
meaningful involvement of those affected by the process.66  Generally participation entails 
the idea of consulting, providing access to information and ensuring the right to express and 
impart views freely.67 Thirdly, accountability requires authorities to be in a position to 
explain and justify the choice of the actual measures; equally it provides individuals and 
communities with the opportunity to understand how governments and others have 
discharged their duty to prevent through different avenues that include, but also go beyond, 
the traditional judicial process.68 Finally, equality requires that in determining the appropriate 
frameworks the State should be mindful of the fact that these do not exacerbate 
discriminatory outcomes and that they enable the less advantaged or the most vulnerable 
sections or groups of society to effectively enjoy individually and collectively their rights.69 
Importantly, whilst these parameters overlap and reinforce each other ‘these criteria are not 
all-or-nothing standards, but permit degrees of fulfilment’.70 
How the obligation to fulfil and these parameters operate in practice can be seen in an Inter-
American Court case involving a detention facility for minors where torture and ill-treatment 
actually occurred. The Court found that the state not only had violated its negative duty to 
prohibit torture and ill-treatment but also that: 
the State did not effectively fulfill its role as guarantor of the rights of the child, in this special 
relationship of subordination between the State and the adult/child deprived of liberty. The State failed to 
take the necessary positive measures to ensure to all inmates decent living conditions. It also failed to 
take the special measures of protection that are required of it where children are concerned.71 
In identifying and recommending the measures to be adopted by the State the Court requested 
that not only the state introduce all necessary modifications into its domestic legislation, but 
that it was to do so by elaborating, within six months and in collaboration with civil society, 
‘a State policy of short, medium and long-term related to children in conflict with the law that 
is fully consistent with its [Paraguay’s] international commitments.’ Furthermore, it 
concluded that state policy must contemplate ‘strategies, appropriate actions and the 
assignation of those resources indispensable for ensuring children deprived of liberty are 
separated from adults (…) and that integral educational, medical and psychological programs 
are created for children deprived of liberty’.72  
The case also suggests that while it is acknowledged that State authorities do have discretion 
in choosing and prioritizing measures they are expected to exercise that discretion and to take 
action. Whether that action leads to immediate fulfilment is another matter. It is 
acknowledged that in some circumstances obligations to fulfil may not be capable of 
immediate fulfilment, because it might require the state to balance priorities deriving from 
various norms and principles and because resources might not be available.73 Furthermore 
immediate fulfilment of the duty might be impracticable given that meaningful change on the 
ground cannot be introduced simply by legislative and administrative authorisation. Change 
is inevitably also a political process which, in order to be successful, must be ‘owned’ by the 
people on the ground. At any rate, even where there are demonstrable resource 
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constraints, the state is not relieved of its duty to devise strategies and plans for the fulfilment 
of the duty.74 
Positive preventive measures 
As a positive obligation to fulfil, the duty to prevent torture and ill-treatment requires the 
state to act or put in place a framework that will lessen the likelihood of torture. The duty is 
triggered whenever the risk of torture might arise. As discussed earlier, this is usually known 
to be associated with deprivation of liberty. Thus anyone deprived of their liberty, whatever 
form it may take, has ‘a right to a positive act’ which translates in the corresponding duty of 
the state authorities to take any reasonable and necessary measures likely to avert the risk of 
torture and ill-treatment irrespective of ‘whether there is any evidence of torture or ill-
treatment actually taking place’.75 
The range of measures that could have a preventive impact is in principle limitless and open 
up a multitude of scenarios. While there might not be any hard and fast rules as to which 
measures are to be given priority it is clear that the selection and adoption of reasonable 
preventive measures must take account of the specific context and the issues which appear to 
be most relevant to the experience of those deprived of their liberty. In doing so the 
parameters of effectiveness, participation, accountability and equality discussed earlier can 
provide normative guidance.  
It is not the intention of this article to produce a comprehensive compendium of preventive 
measures, moreover this would be both impractical as well as at odds with the wide-ranging, 
‘flexible and developmental nature’ of preventive measures.76 Indeed the effectiveness of 
preventive measures is commensurate to their flexibility and ability to adapt and respond to 
the exigencies of changing concrete situations and in response to new problems that gradually 
emerge in practice.77 Hence the following are just examples of broad types of positive 
measures gleaned from case-law as well as from the practice of some of the international and 
regional human rights monitoring bodies especially those with a mandate to access and 
monitor places of detention,78 and which illustrate how the general duty to prevent torture 
might be translated in practice. The next section begins by looking at some of the existing 
visiting bodies which can be said to be basic institutional mechanisms that ensure that States 
take their first steps towards greater compliance with the duty to prevent torture and that, 
once operational, may assist States in moving in the right direction. 
Monitoring places of detention 
Visiting mechanisms most notably include the European Committee for the Prevention of 
Torture (CPT), the UN Subcommittee for the Prevention of Torture (SPT),and the national 
preventive mechanisms (NPM) established under the OPCAT.79 Allowing visits by these 
international preventive mechanisms and establishing NPMs are legal obligations for those 
states that have ratified the Convention and/or the Optional Protocol. But these mechanisms 
can be regarded as well as preventive measures in their own right. Indeed their functioning 
permits signatories states to engage with their positive obligation by accepting and allowing 
monitoring visits to places of detention. These monitoring mechanisms provide a useful 
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illustration of how preventive mechanisms’ work  may be guided by Fredman’s parameters. It 
is widely acknowledged that opening up places of detention to external independent scrutiny 
is one of the most effective ways to prevent torture.80 These independent mechanisms 
produce reports on their visits that enhance state’s accountability, their recommendations aim 
at identifying what is working, what is not, and what needs to be changed. The authorities are 
also in a position to explain and justify their choices and put in place remedies -such as 
organizational/institutional improvements, budgeting, policy formulation, and so forth - 
irrespective of potential and subsequent liability in a legal sense. Reports are also an 
opportunity for individuals and different members of civil society to participate in the process 
by understanding and actively following-up on those recommendations. Through their visits 
these mechanisms ‘can collect and analyse first-hand information about the situation of 
persons deprived of their liberty by direct means such as observation, individual and 
collective interviews with persons in detention and with authorities and NGOs, and from 
those sources draft a report including practical and contextualized recommendations in order 
to prevent torture and ill-treatment’.81 This also leads to the production of general thematic 
reports casting further attention on specific vulnerable groups and the institutional 
arrangements affecting them.82 However states’ acceptance of these monitoring visits and the 
establishment of domestic national preventive mechanisms under the OPCAT is only the 
initial or a partial fulfilment of their positive duty to prevent. A number of issues might arise 
in relation to the effective implementation of the SPT or CPT recommendations, as indeed it 
is the case for other human rights monitoring bodies, as well as in relation to the effective 
functioning of the OPCAT national preventive mechanisms, for example, with regards to the 
scope of their mandate, independence, resources, composition and personnel.83  Where issues 
pertaining to any of these aspects arise, the state is still under an obligation to take action in 
order to ensure greater conformity with the duty to prevent torture.  
General preventive measures 
General preventive measures can also be found in the preventive bodies’ recommendations 
and guidelines dealing with an array of substantive issues. They encompass a wide variety of 
widely acknowledged procedural safeguards for those deprived of their liberty such as those 
built around the ‘trilogy’ of immediate third‐party notification, the right of access to a lawyer, 
and the right to an independent medical examination, accompanied by effective notification 
of these rights.84  Preventive measures also cover the material conditions of detention 
regimes.85 When considering prison overcrowding in the context of article 3, the ECHR, for 
example, has encouraged states to act so as to reduce the number of prisoners, including 
reforming criminal policies and the organization of the prison system,86 using more non-
custodial punitive measures of freedom,87  and minimizing the use of detention.88 The 
practice of preventive monitoring bodies such as the CPT and SPT, have developed 
recommendations regarding conditions of detention touching on a wide variety of issues, 
‘including matters relating to physical conditions, the reasons for, and levels of, occupancy 
and the provision of, and access to, a wide range of facilities and services’.89 These measures 
often intersect and adapt to the specific needs of vulnerable individuals. For instance 
preventive mechanisms have developed guidelines and standards on children and youth 
covering situations ranging from juveniles in police custody to children in social care 
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homes.90 During its monitoring visits the SPT has addressed the situation of youth pre-trial 
detainees and formulated recommendations pertaining to the lock-down hours, the existence 
of dedicated units as well as the adequacy of the mandate of NPMs in relation to the 
treatment of minors and juvenile offenders in police custody, immigration or penitentiary 
institutions.91 
In mental health institutions, the duty may require a variety of measures, which again go 
beyond the material living conditions such as adequate physical structures, food and hygiene 
standards. The UN Special Rapporteur on Torture has recommended banning or reviewing 
certain treatments and practices and providing appropriate human rights education and 
information to healthcare personnel to ‘promote a culture of respect for human integrity and 
dignity’.92Among other things, experts have highlighted the need to develop social services 
structures and systems, including alternatives to institutional care; to review domestic 
legislation on metal disability laws in light on the Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities 93 and to consider widening the composition of inspection mechanisms to include 
service users who ‘do see things that the experts do not, and that the detained service users 
will say things to other service users that they will not say to professional staff’.1 94 
Irrespective of the context or nature of deprivation of liberty the examples above illustrate the 
fact that the implications of the duty to prevent can be said to be procedural and wide ranging 
in that the adoption of plans and strategies are to be developed across a period of time, 
through a multidisciplinary and collaborative approach, and be reviewed and adjusted 
periodically for the benefit of the most vulnerable. As already argued, identifying and 
implementing the most appropriate measures should be a participatory effort and process in 
which domestic authorities, international human rights bodies play a role together with 
different sections of civil society ranging from independent NPMs, non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs) with relevant expertise, relevant professional and group associations, 
to representatives of individuals, the media and so forth. Arguably here lies the challenge for 
members of civil society and other stakeholders of finding new creative ways of fostering the 
right to be free from torture. Unsurprisingly in this last respect, civil society’s ability to 
participate meaningfully in the process presupposes rights such as freedom of expression and 
information and assembly. Therefore, perhaps more surprisingly, preventive measures may 
well encompass relevant measures that would appear to have limited apparent bearing on 
torture focusing for example on free media, transparency, accountability and fighting 
corruption. 95 
 
Conclusion  
 
Whilst it might be self-explanatory to suggest that to ensure the right to be free from torture 
and other ill-treatment the prohibition is not enough and that prevention is equally important, 
what prevention means in terms of a general legal obligation is less so. The article has 
attempted to offer an analytical framework that shifts the focus from the definition of acts of 
torture and other-ill-treatment to the conditions acknowledged to give rise to the risk of 
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torture and other ill-treatment. By virtue of their deprivation of liberty and the inherent 
relation of subordination, individuals are objectively and subjectively vulnerable and action is 
required to address any risk of torture or ill-treatment, which may or may not have manifested 
itself, through the adoption of relevant and effective preventive measures. Understood in a 
broad positive obligation framework and more specifically through the lens of states’ positive 
obligations to fulfil the autonomous duty to prevent torture and ill-treatment finds greater 
clarity. This in turn can contribute to the effective enjoyment of the right to be free from 
torture and other ill-treatment. As Fredman argues ‘An important advantage of viewing some 
rights as rights to an act rather than to an object is that, by moving away from the static view 
of a right as a ‘package’ of goods transferred to the beneficiary, it also leaves space to move 
beyond the understanding of the rights-bearer as a passive beneficiary with no say over the 
nature of the need or the benefit.96 The right to be free from torture therefore allows the 
individual not only to expect that the state will refrain from interfering with her right under 
the absolute prohibition but also, understood as a positive right, it enables anyone –such as a 
prison inmate, a psychiatric patient, migrants in detention centres- whose autonomy is 
curtailed by virtue of a restriction of their liberty, to become a “subject” in a legal 
relationship rather than the “object” of treatment. 
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